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ABSTRACT
Recent research by economists has shown that deindustrialization is more severe in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America than it ever was in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). Nevertheless, most research on deindustrialization is focused on the former centres of Fordist
manufacturing in the industrial heartlands of the North Atlantic. In short, there is a mismatch between
where deindustrialization is researched and where it is occurring, and the objective of this paper is to
shift the geographical focus of research on deindustrialization to the Global South. Case studies from
Argentina, India, Tanzania and Turkey demonstrate the variegated nature of deindustrialization beyond
the North Atlantic. In the process, it is demonstrated that cities in the Global South can inform wider
theoretical discussions on the impacts of deindustrialization at the urban scale.
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摘要
发展中国家城市的去工业化现象. Area Development and Policy. 经济学家近期的研究表明，撒哈拉以南
非洲和拉丁美洲的去工业化现象比高收入国家更为严重。尽管如此，大多数有关去工业化的研究都集中
在北大西洋工业中心地带的前福特制造业中心。简言之，研究去工业化的地区和发生去工业化的地区不
匹配，本文的目的是将去工业化研究的地理重点转移到发展中国家。本文阐述了来自阿根廷，印度，坦
桑尼亚和土耳其的案例研究，这些案例证明了在北大西洋以外地区去工业化的多样性。本文还表明，发
展中国家的城市可以就有关去工业化对城市规模的影响提供更广泛的理论讨论。
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RESUMEN
Desindustrialización en las ciudades del hemisferio sur. Area Development and Policy. En recientes estudios
realizados por economistas se ha mostrado que la desindustrialización es más grave en el África sub-
sahariana y Latinoamérica de lo que nunca fue en la OCDE. Sin embargo, en la mayoría de estudios sobre la
desindustrialización se presta atención a los antiguos centros de manufactura fordista en la concentración
industrial del Atlántico Norte. En suma, existe un desajuste entre dónde se estudia la desindustrialización y
el lugar donde ocurre. El objetivo de este artículo es cambiar el enfoque geográfico de los estudios sobre la
desindustrialización hacia el hemisferio sur. En este artículo se presentan casos prácticos de Argentina,
India, Tanzania y Turquía en los que se demuestra la naturaleza variada de la desindustrialización más allá
del Atlántico Norte. En este proceso, se demuestra que las ciudades del hemisferio sur pueden ilustrar
debates teóricos más amplios sobre los efectos de la desindustrialización a escala urbana.
PALABRAS CLAVE
desindustrialización, declive urbano, urbanismo poscolonial, gentrificación, estudio urbano comparativo
АННОТАЦИЯ
Деиндустриализация в городах глобального Юга.Area Development and Policy. Недавние
исследования экономистов показали, что деиндустриализация в странах Африки к югу от
Сахары и в Латинской Америки является более серьезной, чем где-либо в ОЭСР. Тем не менее
большинство исследований по деиндустриализации сосредоточено на бывших центрах
фордистского производства в промышленном центре Северной Атлантики. Короче говоря,
существует несоответствие между тем, где исследуется деиндустриализация и где она
происходит, и целью данной статьи является смещение географического фокуса исследований
деиндустриализации на глобальный Юг. В данной статье представлены примеры из Аргентины,
Индии, Танзании и Турции, которые демонстрируют пеструю природу деиндустриализации за
пределами Северной Атлантики. Исследование демонстрирует, что города глобального Юга
могут стать источником информации для более широких теоретических дискуссий о
последствиях деиндустриализации на уровне города.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Деиндустриализация, упадок городов, постколониальный урбанизм, джентрификация,
сравнительные урбанистические исследования.
INTRODUCTION
Scholarship on deindustrialization has come of age in the past four decades and has evolved
into a rich interdisciplinary field. It has expanded thematically from an initial focus on political
economy to include less tangible impacts of deindustrialization on people and communities
‘beyond the ruins’ (Cowie & Heathcott, 2003). Although deindustrialization scholarship has
become thematically rich and theoretically sophisticated, its geographical imagination has
remained strikingly limited. A recently edited publication, The Deindustrialized World:
Confronting Ruination in Postindustrial Places (High, MacKinnon, & Perchard, 2017, p. 6),
notes that ‘the centrality of the US experience … has effectively anchored the international
field of research’ since the early 1980s. One ostensible objective of the book is to introduce
‘into the conversation different national contexts’ and ‘reveal the comparative threads drawing
together the particularities of industrial decline in different geographies’ (p. 8). Although the
book’s 15 chapters manage to avoid some of the most studied examples of deindustrialization,
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such as Detroit and Pittsburgh, they regrettably focus exclusively on cities in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The Global South looms large in the background of deindustrialization scholarship, but it
remains a non-descript destination for runaway factories. The implicit assumption embedded
in much of this scholarship is that the South has industrialized at the expense of cities and
communities in the North Atlantic and elsewhere in the OECD. This assumption could not
be farther from the truth. While there has undoubtedly been a reorganization of industrial
production on a global scale – what Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye (1980) termed the ‘new
international division of labour’ – recent research demonstrates that industrial offshoring was a
highly uneven process. Baldwin (2016, p. 2) shows that ‘only six developing nations … saw
their share of world manufacturing rise by more than three-tenths of one percentage point
since 1990’. Over roughly the same period, many countries in Latin America and Africa
experienced deindustrialization that, at least in terms of percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP), exceeds the level experienced by countries in the North Atlantic that are typically the
focus of deindustrialization scholarship (Rodrik, 2016). Indeed, Dani Rodrik shows that ‘the
brunt of globalization and the rise of Asian exporters has been borne by other developing
countries, rather than the advanced economies’ (Rodrik, 2016, p. 16). In summary, there is a
mismatch between where deindustrialization is researched and where it is occurring (however,
see Hassink, Hu, Shin, Yamamura, & Gong, 2018).
This paper broadens the focus of deindustrialization scholarship. The findings from
Rodrik, Baldwin and other economists provide a useful starting point because they demon-
strate the need to shift our focus and explore the emergent geography of deindustrialization in
the Global South. However, their use of country-level data has limitations: most notably, it
problematizes deindustrialization as a national/developmental issue that can be addressed with
industrial and trade policy. It does not inform our understanding of how deindustrialization
unfolds in cities and communities, yet this is precisely the scale at which deindustrialization is
most intensively and viscerally experienced. Indeed, deindustrialization in the North Atlantic
is typically framed as a city/regional problem, and most research is situated at subnational
scales which confirms that it is not only an economic phenomenon. This paper takes its cue
from this rich body of research and focuses on how deindustrialization unfolds in cities in the
South. It presents a broad range of cases from India, Tanzania, Turkey and Argentina. The
objective is two-fold. The first is to recover the experience of people beyond the North
Atlantic whose histories have been erased in scholarship on deindustrialization. The second
is to highlight the variegated modes of deindustrialization in cities in the South, and implicitly
compare these processes with assumptions informed by the experience from the North
Atlantic.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section situates this paper in research on
deindustrialization and postcolonial urbanism. It demonstrates that the former failed to
account for events beyond the North Atlantic, while deindustrialization has remained a
blind spot in the latter. The third section introduces the case studies. The final section
concludes by drawing out comparative insights and identifying avenues of future research at
the intersection of scholarship on deindustrialization and urban studies.
SITUATING DEINDUSTRIALIZATION BEYOND THE NORTH ATLANTIC
At the end of the Second World War, industrial activity was highly concentrated. The United
States had 7% of the global population, yet it controlled more wealth than the rest of the world
and its manufacturing capacity dwarfed foreign rivals (Adas, 2006, p. 223). In the following
decades, the United States launched a programme of reconstruction whose objective was to
restore the industrial capability of Western Europe and Japan to pre-war levels (Ekbladh,
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2009). In response to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the United States embraced
a Fordist–Keynesian model whereby the state sought to impose a wage bargain and contain
conflict between capital and labour.1 The result was a golden era in the North Atlantic, and
according to Esping-Andersen (1996, p. 1), ‘prosperity, equality and full employment seemed
in perfect harmony’. While Esping-Andersen overlooks the fact that discrimination in many
forms was hard-wired into the post-war regime, his glowing appraisal does highlight the
remarkable longevity and stability of this growth episode (Piketty, 2014). This regime entered
a period of crisis in the late 1960s from which it never recovered. It remains unclear whether
the erosion and ultimate breakdown of the post-war economic order was caused by in-built
contradictions or exogenous shocks (Piore & Sabel, 1984), but what is clear is that many
places in the North Atlantic that had powered the post-war economic miracle entered a
prolonged period of decline. Bluestone and Harrison (1982, p. 4) lamented that ‘[t]he system
that seemed so capable of providing a steadily growing standard of living during the turbulent
1960s had become totally incapable of providing people with a simple home mortgage, a stable
job, or a secure pension’.
The 1970s’ economic crisis disrupted the wage bargain in the United States and reacti-
vated dormant hostilities between capital and labour. Industrial capital sought to ‘outrun’
labour by relocating from its traditional bases of operation in the American Northeast and
Midwest to the Southern states where labour was less organized (Bluestone & Harrison,
1980). Capital’s sojourn in the American South was a brief layover in a much longer journey
overseas to so-called ‘Third World’ countries (Bluestone & Harrison, 1980; Dicken, 2015;
Fröbel et al., 1980). Offshoring accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s as advancements in
information and communication technology and international institutions allowed multina-
tional corporations to develop global value chains (Baldwin, 2016; Castells, 1996; Gereffi &
Korzeniewicz, 1994). Cities that had been centres of production and affluence were pro-
foundly impacted by disinvestment and descended into ‘paroxysms of devaluation and dein-
dustrialization’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 185). The speed of this decline was remarkable, and in many
instances, it occurred before policy-makers could devise a meaningful response. Storper and
Walker (1989, p. 90) noted that ‘[w]ithin a few years, or even months, the economic base of a
community can disappear, leaving the empty hulks of obsolete factories and decaying
infrastructure’.
The socio-spatial impacts of deindustrialization in the North Atlantic were explored at the
urban scale by geographers and sociologists who sought to understand how the various
trajectories of the post-industrial transformation of cities contributed to growing inequalities
through the processes of gentrification and abandonment. From the 1970s, gentrification
research was characterized by a debate between consumption- and production-side approaches
that explained gentrification either as a product of the growth of a ‘new middle class’ employed
in service industries (Leys, 1996) or as the reinvestment of capital in previously disinvested
inner-city neighbourhoods (Smith, 1979). Despite disagreement over the specific causes of
gentrification, both approaches understood gentrification as the outcome of structural changes
associated with the loss of industry (Ghertner, 2015). Against the background of this debate,
researchers have explored the urban impacts of deindustrialization by documenting processes
of neighbourhood change and class-based displacement in post-industrial cities such as New
York and London (Curran, 2004; Davidson & Lees, 2005). In contrast to gentrification
researchers’ focus on the displacement that results from the reinvestment of capital, other
researchers have focused on places that continue to be characterized by high levels of
abandonment. Wacquant’s (2008) comparative study of ‘advanced marginality’ in the post-
Fordist city argued that deindustrialization and ‘deproletarianisation’ have resulted in the
concentration of the urban poor in stigmatized ‘neighborhoods of relegation’, such as
Chicago’s poorest neighbourhoods and Parisian banlieues.
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A field of scholarship emerged to capture the broad-based impacts of industrial decline,
that is referred to here as deindustrialization studies. Its initial focus on political economy has
expanded and it has become truly interdisciplinary. The field broadened in line with general
trends in social science, most notably the rise of postmodernity and cultural studies in the
1980s (Strangleman & Rhodes, 2014). Scholarship focused on plant closures and struggles
between unions and corporations gave way to the reappraisal of deindustrialization as a ‘more
socially complicated, historically deep, geographically diverse, and politically perplexing phe-
nomenon than previously thought’ (Cowie & Heathcott, 2003, p. 2). Scholars engaged with
the complexity and far-reaching consequences of deindustrialization, not least of which is the
profound transformation of place and the disintegration of communities and ways of life
(Cowie & Heathcott, 2003; High & Lewis, 2007; Linkon, 2018; Mah, 2012). Although
deindustrialization studies has evolved thematically, its geographical imaginary has curiously
remained stunted. As noted above, deindustrialization in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa has been severe; in the case of the former, the ‘magnitude of adverse employment effects
… is even larger than in developed economies’ (Rodrik, 2016, p. 19). However, deindustria-
lization studies has remained steadfastly rooted in the industrial heartlands of the North
Atlantic, and has only recently begun to account for deindustrialization elsewhere in the
OECD (High et al., 2017). The Global South remains a vague construct, which, when it
appears at all, is as a homogenized recipient of offshored industry.
The failure of deindustrialization studies to account for events in the Global South is
mirrored by the neglect of deindustrialization in postcolonial urban studies. The latter has
critiqued the Western-centric character of mainstream urban studies, with many scholars
heeding Roy’s (2009, p. 820) call to ‘blast open theoretical geographies, to produce a new
set of concepts in the crucible of a new repertoire of cities’. Whereas high-profile debates
around world/global cities privileged a small number of wealthy cities in discussions of urban
modernity, scholars such as Robinson (2006) and Roy (2009) have argued for a postcolonial
approach to urban studies that flattens hierarchies among cities and incorporates the experi-
ences of diverse urban contexts into the generation of new theories of urbanity. In this context,
there is a growing enthusiasm for comparison as a tool for challenging and rethinking
established theories, as well as generating new concepts from locations previously marginalized
in urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2016). However, this body of scholarship has
tended to highlight aspects of cities in the South that render them different from their OECD
counterparts (Bhan, 2019; Lawhon & Truelove, 2019; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Schindler,
2017; Simone, 2010). Indeed, it is the existence of these differences that justifies the very
notion of ‘postcolonial’ or ‘Southern’ urban studies, yet the imperative to highlight difference
has meant that postcolonial urban scholars have avoided interrogating phenomena that are
typically associated with cities in the North Atlantic. In this paper deindustrialization is
recognized as a common process occurring across the North and South, while also remaining
sensitive to the importance of ‘historical difference’ in shaping how its varying trajectories
manifest at the urban scale (Roy, 2016, p. 203).
By shifting the geographical focus of research on deindustrialization to the South, this
paper speaks to ongoing debates in urban studies surrounding the comparability of cities
(Peck, 2015; Roy, 2016; Scott & Storper, 2015). Deindustrialization in the Global South
tends to appear in social science scholarship as a background context for other processes, such
as urban transformation or the erosion of working conditions, rather than a phenomenon
worth researching in its own right (Bremen’s, 2004, study of industrial decline in Ahmedabad
is an important exception). For example, Harris (2008, p. 2421) finds that gentrification in
Mumbai has occurred in the context of ‘local deindustrialisation processes’, such as the
relocation of textile mills to the hinterland. Elsewhere, deindustrialization is portrayed as a
precondition for widespread precarity in post-apartheid Johannesburg (Barchiesi, 2011) and
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the Zambian Copperbelt (Ferguson, 1999). Meanwhile, the decline of state-owned enterprises
in north-east China, and the disappearance of the basket of social benefits that they provided,
serves as the basis for claims-making among retrenched workers (Kwan Lee, 2007). What
remains unclear, however, is the extent to which these local episodes can generate novel
insights into the variegated character of global deindustrialization processes. Rodrik’s (2016)
research provides a tantalizing clue. He notes that in contrast to deindustrialization in the
OECD, deindustrialization in the South is not necessarily accompanied by increased produc-
tivity in the service sector. As the case of Brazil demonstrates, it can even be driven by a
reprimarization of the economy as capital is disinvested from manufacturing and reinvested in
the extraction of resources and agriculture (Gorenstein & Ortiz, 2018; Jenkins, 2015).
Following Robinson’s (2016, p. 20) encouragement to theorize from ‘anywhere’ the identifica-
tion of these local variations raises an important question: How can cities in the Global South
inform wider theoretical discussions of the impacts of deindustrialization at the urban scale?
The case studies presented below speak to this question by showing how deindustrialization
has unfolded in cities in India, Turkey, Tanzania and Argentina.
CASE STUDIES OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
The series of case studies are situated at the intersection of deindustrialization studies and
urban studies from India, Turkey, Tanzania and Argentina. Different methods were used in
each case, such as the analysis of land-use planning documents, analysis of urban political
economies and ethnography. Each case employs a lens that enables an appreciation of
different aspects of deindustrialization as it unfolds in the Global South: the case of India
demonstrates how the drivers and dynamics of deindustrialization can differ between cities
even within the same country; the case of Turkey explores how the relationship between
deindustrialization and urban transformation is mediated by national politics; the case of
Tanzania highlights the impact of deindustrialization on labour, livelihoods and capabilities;
and the case of Argentina draws attention to the importance of iterative processes of
deindustrialization and reindustrialization for analysing the changing geography of cities
beyond the North Atlantic. Taken together, they demonstrate that deindustrialization serves
as a useful entry point for understanding the variegated nature of 21st century globalization
and urbanization.
Variegated deindustrialization in urban India
Much has been written about the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, and the
impacts that this has had on urban regions (Ahluwalia, 2000; Shaw, 1999; Shaw & Satish,
2007). Following liberalization, public sector industries were seen as bureaucratic, inefficient
and badly managed (Khanna, 2015), resulting in disinvestment and an imperative to attract
investment from the private sector. In many Indian metros there has been a gradual disman-
tling and/or relocation of industrial infrastructure and manufacturing units. However, a full
understanding of the drivers and implications of deindustrialization on urban space and
residents requires looking beyond national-level data to study deindustrialization within
specific cities. Here recent research in Mumbai and Bangalore was drawn upon to illustrate
different techniques through which one can learn about the patterns, processes and implica-
tions of deindustrialization.
City-level economic and employment data demonstrate the extent of deindustrialization in
Mumbai. Manufacturing’s share in district GDP fell from 39.10% in 1993/94 to 25.04% in
2009/10, while that of services increased across the period from 59.64% to 73.94% (Pethe,
Nallathiga, Gandhi, & Tandel, 2014). The city’s employment structure has also experienced a
parallel shift towards services. Manufacturing employment as a proportion of total
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employment fell from 36.0% to 28.5% between 1980 and 1990, while in the same period the
trade, finances and services sector increased from 52.1% to 64.3% (Banerjee-Guha, 2002).
Deindustrialization in Mumbai was orchestrated by governments at various scales in
pursuit of a decades-old national policy commitment to relocate industries to underdeveloped
areas beyond the city centre. This imperative accelerated after the political defeat of Mumbai’s
working class in the failed textile mill strike of 1982–83, and the emergence of a Indian urban
regime that has been called the ‘cabal city’ (Heller, Mukhopadhyay, & Walton, 2016). The
argument is that a cabal is a small group of actors who collude across state and market
boundaries to maximize returns to scarce resources, and in this particular case their focus is
on urban land. Logan and Molotch’s (1988) ‘growth machine’ is geared towards the augmen-
tation of land value ‘subject to coherent governance and an overall economic logic’ that results
in growth that is ‘sustainable and inclusive, if not equitable’. By contrast, the primary objective
of the cabal is to extract land-centric rent through the management of spatial transformation.
The drive to maximize the extraction of rent from urban land means that the development
schemes they pursue are rarely aligned with long-term economic growth or competitiveness
(Heller et al., 2016). Thus, officialdom in Mumbai and powerful elites in the private sector
pursue urban development strategies that prioritize increasing the value of land in the short
term, rather than establish the conditions for long-term economic prosperity or
competitiveness.
Mumbai’s cabal is enabled by increasing centralization of power in the state government
and the disempowerment of local government, even as civil society is selectively empowered.
Thus, key planning and policy decisions have become the domain of the Urban Development
Department of the government of Maharashtra (Patel, 2015). The Chief Minister of
Maharashtra, who is typically an elected representative of a distant rural constituency, also
chairs key parastatals that determine redevelopment and infrastructure building initiatives, and
ultimately wields greater power over the built environment in Mumbai than the elected
municipal corporation. The vision for Mumbai’s future that has guided urban development
since the early 2000s has been the city’s ‘Shanghaification’, to which both central and state
governments were committed. These commitments emerged from the famous ‘Vision
Mumbai’ document produced by McKinsey & Co. in 2003 at the request of Bombay First,
a non-governmental organization (NGO) floated by the local business community in 1995,
modelled on London First. Mumbai’s manufacturing sector was to be relocated to the urban
periphery, while the plan envisioned the tertiarization of the city centre.
In practice, the city’s transformation is guided by instrumental concerns of those with the
power to determine land use. Mumbai’s cabal overrides the disciplinary logic and practice of
‘technical planning’ by trained professionals in state organizations, and instead it leverages
‘sovereign planning’ by fiat from the highest level of the subnational government
(Krishnankutty, 2018). The resulting urbanism is marked by a tension between, on the one
hand, an aspirational and discursive ideal that may be called ‘engine urbanism’ (Burte, 2016–
17) and, on the other, the realized urbanism founded on land-centric rent extraction favouring
the cabal. Indeed, it is through the transformation of urban space – that is, from derelict textile
mills to gated communities – that rent is generated. However, urbanism founded on land-
centric rent extraction favours a small elite whose strategic positions allow them to capture the
revenue generated – formally and informally – by the transformation of the urban fabric (cf.
Chattaraj & Walton, 2017; Nijman, 2000). An illustrative example is the 1996 intervention by
the government of Maharashtra (of which Mumbai is the state capital) to override the
municipal corporation’s more equitable proposal for urban development, which allowed textile
mill owners to retain land leased to them for industry and redevelop it for non-industrial
purposes (Adarkar & Phatak, 2005). This enabled inequitable land rent extraction following
deindustrialization, as industrial land was converted to real estate.
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The repercussions of the cabal city are experienced in Mumbai in many forms: by its
unsystematic urban development that favours land-rent extraction over other social or even
capitalistic objectives; in its prioritization of interventions with short-term efficacy but long-
term unsustainability that are implemented with scant local political oversight through para-
statals: in the four years from 1997, for example, approximately 40 flyovers were built in the
city, flying in the face of any transportation planning logic; in the opaque and often contra-
dictory logic embraced by officials situated at various scales; in the splintering of classes and
communities that has been deepened on the ground (Anand, 2006; Zérah, 2008); and in the
violence it has enacted on the poor and in the scattered practices of coping and contestations
that it has catalysed (Bhide, 2013; Burte & Kamath, 2017). The shift in priority from a model
of urban development in which industry played a role, however small, in the city’s economy, to
a regime geared towards land-rent extraction means that sovereign planning in Mumbai has
consisted of selective interventions largely designed to augment lucrative real estate and
infrastructure projects that are necessarily out of the reach of the majority of the population,
including retrenched workers, thereby deepening Mumbai’s housing crisis. Meanwhile, pro-
poor projects that may reduce inequalities, such as improvement of the uneven and inadequate
water-supply systems and sanitation provision across the city, have been largely postponed or
even ignored (Zérah, 2008) as they are less monetizable. For example, transportation planning
has moved in the opposite direction from inclusive mobility through the rapid expansion of
car-friendly road infrastructure (including a sea-link and an upcoming coastal road). This
infrastructure has opened up new peri-urban lands for real estate development and also
reinforced the centrality of the central business district (CBD) and South Mumbai, contra-
dicting the state’s own historical commitment to deconcentration.
Bangalore’s economy exhibits a shift from industrial to post-industrial sectors reminiscent
of processes played out in cities in the OECD. Municipal authorities are involved in the real
estate sector (Goldman, 2011), but in contrast with Mumbai’s cabal whose efforts are often at
odds with stated planning objectives, their efforts to capture rents have complemented the
city’s very real shift to post-industrial sectors and its emergence as India’s premiere high-tech
hub. The impacts on the city’s manufacturing base have been significant. An analysis of land
use in Bangalore’s spatial planning documents highlights a clear shift from public investment
in manufacturing to private investment in services and real estate.
Industrial transformation has had a significant impact on Bangalore’s urban form and the
urban economy, visible through an analysis of successive master plans and changing land-use
plans. Post-independence Bangalore’s urban form was determined largely by the creation of
five large public sector units (PSUs) that focused mainly on manufacturing for defence,
national security and other sensitive industries. These industries not only are employers but
also are industrial townships on the urban periphery that provided housing, schools, healthcare
and other amenities to employees and their families. These PSUs encouraged the development
of auxiliary micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) throughout the city. As
Bangalore’s economy has become increasingly service oriented – primarily driven by informa-
tion technology companies – its PSUs and MSMEs are gradually shutting down or moving
out of the city. These shifts have had profound impacts on the city’s built form. Large tracts of
vacant former industrial land are increasingly being converted to high-end residential and/or
commercial uses. One illustration of this is the case of the Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT)
watch factory that was shut in 2016. The factory land has been parcelled into smaller units,
with 10 acres converted into mixed-use real estate and 210 acres sold to the Indian Space
Research Organization.
Analysis of land use of the 2004, 2015 and 2031 Bangalore master plans shows that land
allocated to industrial use within the city’s boundaries has been declining over the last two
decades, with industrial land gradually being converted to (primarily) residential land (Table 1).
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Analysis of specific parcels on the northern and eastern peripheries of Bangalore reveals that
nearly 2500 hectares of industrial land has been converted primarily into residential use.
Industries are being relocated to the urban periphery where Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board (KIADB) land banks are being consolidated in ways that favour formal
capital-intensive industrial production. These reallocations are consistent with broader national
government plans to build industrial corridors and new industrial settlements, though it is unclear
whether these settlements will house existing plants that are being relocated from within the city
or new emerging industries. Initial analysis therefore indicates that manufacturing is declining
within the city, particularly with reference to SMEs and the informal sector.
The current trend of dismantling industry and manufacturing in Bangalore seems to sit in
contradiction with the national and regional governments’ push to promote manufacturing and
establish new industrial settlements throughout industrial corridors. Furthermore, it exacer-
bates a mismatch between the city’s labour force and the kinds of investments that are being
made as part of the new wave of urban development which favours capital-intensive high-tech
industry and globally oriented information-technology enabled services. There is also a grow-
ing presence of global actors in the development of these new industrial settlements, as
investors, developers as well as tenants, which has further implications for how peri-urban
industrialization takes place.
The two case studies presented here indicate that deindustrialization can be driven by state
disinvestment in manufacturing and industry, tied to a rebalancing of the economy towards
finance and service sectors, and tied up in intricate – and informal – coalitions of rent-seeking
state and non-state actors prioritizing profit over more equitable development. There is also a
clear trend towards spatial transformation that is emerging in these cities that favours
particular types of urban development, focusing largely on real estate development. It is
increasingly apparent that deindustrialization in its current form will leave a legacy, because
many urban residents will neither benefit from employment opportunities within the new
economy nor be able to afford housing in redeveloped areas.
Table 1. Existing land use (ELU) and proposed land use (PLU) planning in Bangalore’s master plans
Area (km
2
)
Land use ELU, 2004 PLU, 2015 ELU, 2015 PLU, 2031
Residential 159.76 460.61 270.40 348.00
Commercial 13.37 19.04 29.60 12.44
Industrial 58.80 98.22 41.13 35.13
Open spaces and green parks 13.10 71.06 30.23 24.20
Water bodies 34.30 38.00 42.10 55.20
Agriculture 591.73 343.00 150.00 168.00
Public and semi-public space 53.50 46.00 60.00 72.00
Vacant land 85.20
Transportation 42.56 25.00 46.50
Defence 35.27 35.65 35.27 42.05
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State-coordinated urban transformation in Turkey
Turkish industry is highly competitive in some sectors, and its profile is increasingly shifting
from low- to medium-skilled sectors (Hallward-Driemeier & Nayyar, 2018). However, as a
percentage of GDP manufacturing peaked at 23% in 1989 and remained more or less constant
until 1998 when it began to fall.2 The downward trend continued until 2010 when manufactur-
ing comprised 15% of GDP and it then began inching upwards. While Turkey’s global share of
manufacturing increased between 1994 and 2014, the share of manufacturing value-added in
GDP decreased (Hallward-Driemeier & Nayyar, 2018). Government spending has sought to
counter lagging demand, particularly since the coup attempt in 2016, and this has led to
unsustainable levels of borrowing (OECD, 2018). The national government has channelled
this money into the built environment, housing and infrastructure.
This section focuses on deindustrialization in Turkish cities in general, given the fact that
state-coordinated efforts designed to catalyse urban transformation are situated at the national
scale. Thus, while the reverberations of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ambitions
are most evident in İstanbul (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011), it is
important to note that analogous processes are playing out in less dramatic fashion in Turkey’s
largest cities.
From the early 2000s onwards, public spending targeted infrastructure and housing
projects, and this fostered a boom in the construction sector, which, as a percentage of
GDP, increased from 11.5% in 2008 to 17.0% in 2017 (OECD, 2018). The centrality of
the construction sector – which is often included in ‘manufacturing’ data – belies a broader
shift in Turkey’s political economy that favours urban transformation at the expense of
manufacturing. Indeed, the rapid transformation of Turkish cities is a cornerstone of the
ruling AKP’s claim to legitimacy. Since coming to power in 2002 under the leadership of
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the wake of an economic crisis, the AKP has consolidated a national
development strategy geared towards urban transformation. Its claim to success rests on its
ability to manage fundamental urban transformation across Turkey in ways that incorporate a
diverse range of stakeholders. This national-led urban development strategy extends the
promise of new forms of urban citizenship to conservative and poor populations in Anatolia,
and especially to those in metropolitan cities who the AKP (and its predecessor, the National
Vision Movement)3 has claimed to be marginalized by the secular regime since the inception
the republic in 1923. Leaving behind the anti-West/globalization/neoliberalism attitude of its
predecessor, the regime established by the AKP is anchored by a politics of hope whereby it
speaks to the aspirations of Turkey’s urban poor and the middle class, and extends the promise
of what Brand and Wissen (2018) refer to as an ‘imperial mode of living’.
The AKP’s urban transformation strategy enjoyed broad-based support, and its power was
rooted in the formation of a coalition after the 2002 elections that included the conservative
urban poor, Anatolian bourgeoisie, political Islamists and Westward-looking secular middle
class (Somel, 2011; Türkay, 2011). It was financed by an inflow of capital from global
investors in the form of cheap bank credit (Balaban, 2011; Savran, 2013), which prioritized
urban development schemes over investment in capital goods and manufacturing. The result
was a booming urban property market that encouraged industrialists and other fractions of
capital to invest in the (re)development of urban land. This regime is anchored by a carefully
constructed notion of urban citizenship designed to appeal to populations that were margin-
alized before the AKP’s rise to power. Rather than one’s status as a waged labourer, member-
ship in the political economy of Turkey’s largest cities became based on property ownership,
and for the first time, poor conservative populations were able to enter the formal real estate
market en masse (Doğan, 2016; Karaman, 2013; Şengül, 2013). For this rather precarious
population, the ownership of assets (e.g., real estate) offset the negative consequences of
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deindustrialization, at least in the short term. The rents generated by Turkey’s booming state-
supported real estate market were distributed to the AKP’s constituents through patronage
networks, while the bourgeoisie was able to earn handsome profits through its connection to
the construction sector (Doğan, 2016). Elsewhere the central government was directly
involved in the production of housing (Balaban, 2012), and it established a delicate balancing
act in which the proceeds of urban transformation were (re)distributed through negotiation
among diverse actors at multiple scales (government ministries, municipalities, investors,
residents, businesses, religious charities) (e.g., Bedirhanoğlu, 2015; Penpecioğlu, 2016).
Thus, in contrast to the traumatic effects of deindustrialization in the West (Strangleman &
Rhodes, 2014), the AKP’s urban strategy fostered deindustrialization, while simultaneously
offering hitherto excluded sections of society a ‘modern’ urban (Islamic) lifestyle via newly
built spaces of habitation and consumption (Bayırbağ & Penpecioğlu, 2017).
The AKP’s response to the global economic crisis of 2008 was to deepen and widen its
efforts to transform urban areas, which was enabled further by quantitative easing and low
interest rates in the United States and Europe. It was as if the AKP were riding a bicycle ever
faster in order to maintain its balance, and the result was a deepening reliance on financializa-
tion of the urban built environment while manufacturers struggled as demand from world
markets declined (Aalbers, 2013; cf. Akçay & Güngen, 2014, p. 200; Bayırbağ, 2013b).
Slackening demand was offset by a dramatic increase in public spending on large-scale
infrastructure projects, which initiated a wave of urban transformation projects across the
country and opening of new areas for the construction sector (Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014;
Şengül, 2013; Topal, Yalman, & Çelik, 2019). The cracks in this regime began to show in the
late 2000s as short-term gains were unable to offset the long-term costs of (1) excessive public
spending, (2) prioritization of investment in the built environment over more productive
sectors of the economy and (3) the controversial impacts of total urban transformation.4
Thus, following the 2011 elections, the AKP’s urban development regime increasingly relied
on coercion rather than consent. It was apparent that Turkey’s household and private-sector
debt was unsustainable, and to this discontent was added the colonization of public and
common spaces by construction firms friendly with the AKP.
Unrelenting pressure on public space in Turkish cities fostered a tense environment, and
public anger exploded in İstanbul over the proposed redevelopment of Gezi Park in 2013
(Bayırbağ, 2013b; Gündoğdu, 2013; Şengül, 2015). Furthermore, Turkey’s political and
economic crises have mounted since the coup attempt in 2016, and the constitution and the
politico-administrative system of the country have been radically altered to institutionalize
authoritarianism in its aftermath. National politics play out at the urban scale given the
centrality of the transformation of cities in the AKP’s political platform. Given that the
AKP emerged from a nationwide urban hegemonic project led by the National Vision
Movement (Bayırbağ, 2013a), most of the major figures of the AKP first entered the national
political arena in 1994 as mayors from the Welfare Party (most notably Erdoğan as Mayor of
İstanbul). The AKP’s candidates lost municipal elections in most metropolitan cities in 2019
(including their stronghold, İstanbul), and although it is too soon to tell whether this signals
the beginning of the end of its grip on power at the national scale, it does seem to indicate that
its regime of urban transformation has reached its limits. Any new model of development will
likely require a concerted effort to reindustrialize Turkey’s cities and rebalance manufacturing
capacity vis-à-vis the construction sector.
The case of Turkey offers several lessons on the spatio-temporality of deindustrialization.
First, this case demonstrates that urban transformation can act as a driving force, rather than
simply an outcome, of deindustrialization. Whereas Smith (1979) and Marcuse (1985) found
that deindustrialization in US inner cities created the conditions for subsequent processes of
gentrification, Curran (2004) demonstrates that gentrification can also contribute to the
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displacement of industry from urban areas. Similarly, deindustrialization in Turkey has
occurred due to an influx of investment in the built environment, especially financial capital
from abroad. Indeed, state-coordinated urban transformation in Turkey has been shown to
trigger, or at least accelerate, deindustrialization. Second, the term ‘deindustrialization’ often
refers to a historical rupture where industrialization is replaced by urbanization as a mode of
wealth creation and (re)distribution. However, the example of Turkey indicates that it is
important to detect continuities between those two moments of capitalism, and their coex-
istence takes the spatial form of heterogeneous geographies of accumulation, lending support
to a point made by Henri Lefebvre that ‘so-called underdeveloped countries are now char-
acterized by the fact that they undergo the rural, the industrial, and the urban simultaneously’
(Lefebvre, 2002, p. 32). Finally, departing from the caveat that ‘[i]t is crucial that we resist the
temptation to explain urbanization as a straightforward manifestation of global capitalism’
(Schindler, 2017, p. 6), this case demonstrates the importance of accounting for the variegated
ways in which global capitalism is translated by national political-economic regimes that are
manifested in cities.
Precarity, work and intergenerational tension in Tanzania
East Africa experienced an industrial boom in the decade following the Second World War,
and Tanganyika (Tanganyika and Zanzibar established a union in 1964 and became Tanzania)
was no exception, with its exports growing from £8.6 million to £48.3 million between 1945
and 1952 (Burton, 2005, p. 214). Tanzanian manufacturing was largely state owned, and most
subsectors peaked in the early to mid-1970s (Coulson, 2013). The slowdown was caused by a
combination of factors including mismanagement, drought and a costly war with Uganda, and
by the early 1980s there was a full-blown crisis (Tripp, 1997). In spite of continued public
investment, Tanzanian industry shrank by 11.2% in 1981 (Tripp, 1997), and by the late 1990s
most large-scale textile mills had been closed (Government of Tanzania, 1996). Workers
suffered tremendously during the crisis, as real wages fell by 83% between 1974 and 1988
(Tripp, 1997).
Industry in Tanzania was initially clustered almost exclusively along Pugu Road in Dar es
Salaam, from where it expanded to other parts of the city and other cities (Iliffe, 1979). Several
parastatals were established in Arusha and became national champions. Despite enjoying more
reliable water and energy supply than their counterparts in Dar es Salaam, many did not
survive the crisis (de Valk, 1996). Indeed, empty and derelict factories are testament to the
scarcity of opportunities for Arusha’s working class. By 2012, only 12% of Arusha’s formal-
sector workforce was employed in the manufacturing sector (National Bureau of Statistics
(NBOS), 2015). Three key issues around the lingering effects of the economic crisis in Arusha
are notable: its influence on youth livelihood outcomes; intergenerational tensions; and a
deterioration of working terms and conditions. Arusha’s young men and women find them-
selves in increasingly competitive labour markets, rarely able to find stable work and reliant
upon informal, irregular and insecure work opportunities. While young people constitute
nearly half of Arusha city’s population, they are overrepresented in unemployment rates.
These stand at 8.4% for young people and 3.3% for adults (NBOS, 2016). In the disadvan-
taged ward where the present research took place, rates of youth unemployment were
significantly higher: 37% and 53% for young men and women, respectively (Banks, 2016).
This has serious implications for sociality and livelihoods. Work is key to social
acceptance and recognition, allowing young people to achieve other important cultural
markers of adulthood: getting married, establishing their own house, having children and
becoming recognized as legitimate citizens. Land ownership and the establishment of a
family have served as avenues to respectability in Tanzania, yet these are unattainable by the
youth who lack stable livelihoods. Youth under- and unemployment has also fuelled
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widespread stereotypes of young people as criminals, or ‘wahuni’ in Swahili (Burton, 2005),
further limiting the institutional support afforded to them from the community.
Households in this disadvantaged ward traditionally stop supporting their young people
after finishing school. Where they cannot find work to meet their needs, assumptions are
made that they must be supporting themselves through crime, including theft and
prostitution.
The inability of parents and elders to help young people navigate this precarious labour
market exacerbates these impacts. Many made the transition to adulthood in the ‘golden age’
of Arusha’s industrial past. Community leaders spoke of how it was ‘easy and smooth’ to get a
job before all the factories closed. While small business was still a preferred form of work, large
numbers were employed in factories, and this fuelled a thriving local economy. Limited
opportunities for wage labour and widespread poverty have left parents ill-equipped to guide
their children in these challenging labour markets. Parents had put their faith in the education
system, hoping that it would equip their children with labour market-relevant skills and
knowledge. However, amidst large youth populations and tight labour markets, the payoffs
from education are ambiguous. Intergenerational tensions emerge as young people are fru-
strated that their parents have not provided them with the guidance, education or skills
investment they can use to find gainful employment. Meanwhile, parents claim that un(der)
employed youth are distracted by leisure opportunities offered by the city and ‘stop listening’.
They interpret this as a rejection of traditional values, further exacerbating tensions. Local
leaders said that young people have ‘chosen globalization to be their parents’ so that they can
‘copy and paste’ the lives they admire further afield.
This large-scale shortage of jobs also has repercussions on the wages and working condi-
tions of remaining factory work. Factory work is far from a desirable job for young people,
who voice concerns around the low pay, the arduous work, the long hours and its impacts on
health. One young man who had to leave a job at a cement factory due to respiratory problems
explained that once you have left for a ‘personal problem’ a factory will not take you back. Not
only are wages low but also young people tend to be offered short-term contracts and are paid
less than their senior colleagues. After seeing multiple older workers being recruited onto
permanent contracts over the two years he had worked at a factory, one young man got
together with some friends to ask the manager why their positions remain tenuous and
impermanent. The manager took umbrage and they were sacked. Despite repeated attempts
to secure compensation through formal channels, they were unsuccessful. ‘We saw such pain in
having to fight for it,’ the young man stated, ‘but we wanted to know why they were not
treating us like human beings.’ Amidst the scarcity of formal-sector work, there is little
incentive for employers to offer better working conditions or more stable contracts. Where
one young person is unhappy with their conditions, another will be willing to take his or her
place. Indeed, each week on the recruitment day of one of Arusha’s few remaining factories,
large crowds wait outside factory gates in the hope they will be selected. As one young man
explained, ‘There may be 10 or 15 getting in on a good day, but there will be 70 people waiting
at the gate!’ Thus, deindustrialization has not only disrupted social reproduction but also
resulted in intergenerational conflict and rivalry.
Processes of deindustrialization have fundamentally changed the economic and social
landscape of Arusha. The oversupply of youth labour in combination with its stagnant labour
market has resulted in insecure and exploitative working conditions. While the social and
cultural changes accompanying urbanization are not driven solely by deindustrialization, the
widespread poverty and insecurity left in its wake has exacerbated social problems and limited
the ability of parents and elders to support young people. Frustrations, limited ambitions and a
‘transitional limbo’ characterize the experience of youth in Arusha.
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Crisis and contested deindustrialization in Argentina
One of the first countries in the Global South to experience large-scale industrial develop-
ment, Argentina also constitutes a significant case of premature deindustrialization (Castillo &
Martins Neto, 2016). Argentina has a long history of industrial decline interspersed with
periods of reindustrialization (Basualdo, 2001; Cohen, 2012; Waisman, 1987). Cycles of de-
and re-industrialization have been closely related to the national development strategies
pursued by successive Argentinian governments in the latter half of the 20th century (Rock,
2002). Import substitution under successive post-war governments gave way to export-
oriented industrial growth under Carlos Menem in the 1990s (Cohen, 2012; Waisman,
1987). This chapter of Argentine history ended with one of the most severe economic crises
recorded in recent history (Epstein & Pion-Berlin, 2006; Varesi, 2010). Between 2003 and
2015, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner cultivated a demand-driven recovery of industry by
protecting local industries and workers from global competition and subsidizing domestic
consumption. In addition to these shifts in trade and industrial policy, successive governments
have responded to deindustrialization by incentivizing speculative investments in urban-based
sectors such as property development, consumer services and the creative industries. As a
result, Argentina’s largest cities have been transformed into mosaics of socioeconomic inequal-
ity, characterized by fragmented land-use and chaotic territorial governance regimes.
These trends are particularly evident in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region,
Argentina’s largest demographic and industrial agglomeration with over 15 million residents.
An extensive literature in the interdisciplinary field of urban studies documents the socio-
spatial changes that emerged during the last military dictatorship (1976–83) and accelerated
during the long neoliberal decade of the 1990s (1989–2001) (DuBois, 2005; Janoschka, 2002;
Silvestri & Gorelik, 2000). Scholars have documented how the industrial metropolis associated
with post-war Argentine developmentalism was transformed into an unevenly globalized post-
industrial city-region characterized by large swaths of derelict and environmentally degraded
industrial space, bubbles of luxury real estate development and concentrations of long-term
unemployed workers in informally built and underserved neighbourhoods (Janoschka, 2002;
Kanai, 2011; Prevot Schapira, 2002; Svampa & Pereyra, 2003; Torres, 2001).
Argentina is once again experiencing a major economic crisis that threatens to reverse the
industrial gains made in the long decade of Kirchnerism following the neoliberal debacle.
Although industry benefited from increased domestic demand during the protectionist
Kirchner years, export commodities such as soy crops were the primary driver of national
economic growth. As such, the Kirchners’ development strategy failed to establish the condi-
tions for more sustainable and inclusive manufacturing growth (Teubal & Palmisano, 2015).
Furthermore, economic recovery was cut short by the imposition of a new programme of
economic liberalization and conservative policy reforms under President Mauricio Macri
(2016–19), whose administration aspired to establish a new model of accumulation with a
set of policies including the lifting of previous currency exchange controls, economic dereg-
ulation and fiscal reform. The intention of this model was to integrate the Argentine economy
more thoroughly, and not only through primary exports, into global value chains. While the
foreign investments that the Macri government sought to attract have failed to materialize,
Argentina is once again on the brink of economic crisis and experiencing deindustrialization
(Natanson, 2019). Particularly hard hit are the SMEs located in metropolitan Buenos Aires
that serve the domestic market and face shrinking aggregate demand.
The deepening transnationalization of Argentina during the Macri years may not have
ushered in an era of investment-driven industrial competitiveness and innovation, but it did
have important implications for the geography of metropolitan Buenos Aires. One dimension
of Macri’s strategy to attract foreign investment featured infrastructure upgrading, particularly
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focused on the transport and energy sectors. In fact, during its temporary presidency of the
G20, Argentina identified infrastructure investments as one of the overarching aims for the
year’s agenda. Thereby, the country sought to participate in the emerging global model of
infrastructure-led development and capture some of the North to South capital flows focused
on infrastructure projects (Kanai & Schindler, 2019; Schindler & Kanai, 2019). In Buenos
Aires, this has translated into a thorough revamping of logistics connectivity. The city’s single
largest infrastructure project is a controversial US$700 million underground roadway corridor
stretching 7 km, and linking the southern and northern highways with the city centre
(Vallejos, 2017). While industrial parks in outer-ring suburbs are likely to benefit from
improved connectivity with the city’s port, disused factories and other industrial spaces in
the central city and inner suburbs have either been redeveloped for commercial and residential
uses or simply left derelict (Dinardi, 2019).
Macri’s defeat in the October 2019 elections may signal a return to more protectionist
approach reminiscent of the Kircher era. It is also important to recognize that the model
described above has provoked grassroots contestation. For example, popular struggles against
deindustrialization have animated worker-led occupations of shuttered factories and the
establishment of democratically managed cooperatives. Furthermore, an urban environmental
movement has emerged to demand state action to address the hazards that the city’s residents
face as a result of inadequately regulated industrial production, such as exposure to floods and
air pollution (Abrutzky, Dawidowski, Murgida, & Natenzon, 2014; Auyero & Swistun, 2009).
Proposals to improve environmental conditions through, for example, increasing the amount
of green/blue infrastructure in the city envision abandoned industrial spaces as opportunity
areas to implement such innovations. In this sense, Buenos Aires is not only an important case
study to analyse the drivers and consequences of deindustrialization in Latin America but also
a site from which to learn how grassroots’ mobilization could lead to the realization of more-
just and more-than-industrial urban futures.
CONCLUSIONS
The diverse cases discussed in this paper illustrate that processes of deindustrialization have
significantly different influences on the geography and political economy of cities in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. As such, it demonstrates that there is a pressing
need for researchers to pay greater attention to the relationship between deindustrialization
and urban transformation in cities of the Global South. This research can make a significant
contribution to the ongoing project to shift the focus of urban studies away from a small
number of privileged cities in the North (Roy, 2009). Indeed, by exploring the urban dynamics
of deindustrialization outside of cities traditionally understood as ‘post-industrial’, this research
on cities in the South has the potential to disrupt outmoded epistemological distinctions
between ‘modern’ and ‘developing’ cities (Robinson, 2006). In the process, it can build on the
comparative turn in urban research in order to question and rethink established urban theories,
and to generate new theoretical accounts in the process (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2016).
Although a systematic comparison is beyond the scope of this paper, when taken together,
the cases indicate several fruitful avenues for future research. First, the case of India illustrates
that the relationship between deindustrialization and urban development can vary between
cities within the same country. While both Mumbai and Bangalore have undergone what
Shatkin (2016) refers to as a ‘real estate turn’, Mumbai’s is driven by a cabal, while Bangalore’s
transformation is underpinned by an unmistakable shift to a post-industrial economy. Second,
the paper indicates the need for comparative research to explore the variegated relationship
between economic change and urban transformation in different cities, both across the South
and between OECD and Southern cities. Although the deindustrialization of US cities often
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precipitated urban processes of capital reinvestment and gentrification (Marcuse, 1985; Smith,
1996), the case of Turkey indicates that investment in the built environment may in some
instances precipitate industrial decline (although see Curran, 2004, for a similar phenomenon
in the United States). As such, a more globally oriented deindustrialization studies can
contribute new insights into the relationship between primary and secondary circuits of capital
in particular urban contexts (Shin, 2014).
The relationship between processes of deindustrialization and dynamics of social inclusion/
exclusion is not predetermined and will be contingent on the political-economic dynamics of
specific urban contexts. Whereas deindustrialization in Tanzania has contributed to the
exclusion of young people from formal wage labour, the AKP’s regime of urban citizenship
in Turkey demonstrates that its shift of emphasis from industrialization to urbanization can
potentially be mobilized to create new forms of inclusion on the basis of asset ownership.
Further research should explore whether new modes of citizenship are emerging in contexts
where participation in the formal labour force is no longer a realistic aspiration (Ferguson,
2015), and where urbanization is likely to proceed without significant industrialization.
Finally, the case of Argentina demonstrates that deindustrialization – and periods of reindus-
trialization – is a process that can be contested and subverted. In Buenos Aires there is a
history of contestation, as with the occupied factories movement and more recent environ-
mental movements. As such, future scholarship on the urban politics of deindustrialization
should attend to the agency of city dwellers who may not necessarily be workers and the
emergence of new sites of value creation and struggle. For example, Gago (2017) showed how
a market on the periphery of Buenos Aires where land ownership was indeterminate became a
hive of transnational economic activity that allowed many retrenched workers to create and
capture value during the 2001 crisis. The cases discussed in the present paper indicate possible
methodological avenues for researching deindustrialization at the urban scale, including:
political-economic analysis to understand how state actors have sought to respond to and
shape processes of economic change; analysis of spatial planning documents and remote
sensing to track changes in the built environment over time; and ethnographic methods to
understand city dwellers’ lived experience of deindustrialization.
In conclusion, scholarship on deindustrialization has become thematically and theoretically
sophisticated, yet it has failed to keep up with the 21st century’s evolving geography of
deindustrialization. Meanwhile, urban scholars have begun to craft a body of scholarship
focused on the novelty of urban processes in the Global South, in the world’s largest and
most dynamic cities. However, this scholarship has paid insufficient attention to deindustria-
lization. In this paper, initial steps have been taken to bridge these two bodies of scholarship.
Hopefully, future research will build on this paper to create a more globally oriented deindus-
trialization studies.
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NOTES
1. US policy differed significantly in the so-called ‘Third World’ where it tasked military-led
counterinsurgency states with ‘modernization’ (Simpson, 2008).
2. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=TR.
3. The National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) dates from the late 1960s.
Thanks to their hegemonic discourse and strategy targeting those ‘excluded’ by the secular
regime and the post-1980 neoliberal policies, they captured the major metropolitan munici-
palities in 1994, when the leader of the AKP, Erdoğan, was elected the mayor of İstanbul
Metropolitan Municipality. The AKP was founded in 2001 as a splinter party by the
‘reformist’ wing of the movement (Bayırbağ, 2013a).
4. For a detailed discussion of the destructive impact of this strategy on the urban poor in
İstanbul, see Karaman and Islam (2012), Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) and Lovering and
Türkmen (2011); and for the urban poor in İzmir, see Demirtaş-Milz (2013). For its
broader impact in the form of increasing household indebtedness in Turkey, see Ergüder
(2015).
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